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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
James John Dusenbery timely appeals from the district court's judgment of
conviction and its order revoking probation. On appeal, Mr. Dusenbery argues that the
Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection when it refused to
augment the record with various transcripts he requested to be created at the public's
expense. Additionally, Mr. Dusenbery argues that the district court abused its discretion
when it revoked probation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In docket number 40156 (hereinafter, First Case), Mr. Dusenbery was charged,
by Information, with grand theft by possession, possession of a controlled substance,
and an enhancement for a prior conviction under the Uniform Substance Control Act.
(R., pp.48-51.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Dusenbery pleaded guilty to

possession of a controlled substance and accessory to grand theft by possession.
(R., pp.65-66.)

Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years

with four years fixed, for possession of a controlled substance, and a concurrent unified
sentence of five years, with three years fixed, for accessory to grand theft by
possession.

(R., pp.69-73.)

The district court also retained jurisdiction and

subsequently placed Mr. Dusenbery on probation after successfully completing his
period of retained jurisdiction, (hereinafter, rider). (R., pp.69-73, 77-83.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation alleging
that Mr. Dusenbery had violated

the terms of his probation.

(R.,

pp.84-85.)

Mr. Dusenbery admitted that he violated the terms of his probation by using marijuana
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and methamphetamine. (R., pp.95-96.)

The district court then revoked probation and

placed Mr. Dusenbery on a second rider.

(R., pp.98-102.)

After successfully

completing his second rider, the district court suspended Mr. Dusenbery's sentence and
placed him on probation. (R., pp.107-111.)
After a second period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation
alleging that Mr. Dusenbery violated the terms of his probation.

(R., pp.115-117.)

Mr. Dusenbery admitted that he violated the terms of his probation by using
methamphetamine and being in possession of methamphetamine.
123.)

(R., pp.115, 122-

The State also filed new criminal charges based on his possession of

methamphetamine, and an enhancement for a prior conviction under the Uniform
Substance Control Act,

in docket number 40157,

(hereinafter,

Second Case).

(R., pp.184-187.) In the Second Case, Mr. Dusenbery pleaded guilty to possession of a

controlled substance and, in return, the State dismissed the enhancement. (Tr., p.38,
L.3 - p.44, L.4.)
At a consolidated sentencing/disposition hearing, the district court imposed and
executed a concurrent sentence of five years, with two fixed, in the Second Case.
(Tr., p.56, Ls.3-9; R., pp.226-228.) In the First Case, the district court revoked probation
and executed the underlying sentences, but sua sponte reduced the length of
Mr. Dusenbery's sentences. (Tr., p.64, Ls.4-9.) Specifically, it reduced the sentence for
the possession charge to five years, with two years fixed, and it reduced the accessory
to grand theft sentence to four years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.64, Ls.4-9; R., p.126.)
Mr. Dusenbery timely appealed in both cases. (R., pp.131-134, 230-233.)
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On appeal, Mr. Dusenbery filed a motion to augment the record with various
transcripts.

(Motion to Augment, pp.1-3.)

request for the transcripts.

The State objected to Mr. Dusenbery's

(Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the

Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, Objection to Motion
to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order denying
his request for transcripts of the dispositional hearing, held on November 23, 2010, and
the rider review hearing held on March 28, 2011. (Order Denying Motion to Augment
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment),
p.1.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Dusenbery due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked probation in the First
Case and failed to place Mr. Dusenbery probation in the Second Case?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Dusenbery Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary
Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues raised on appeal.
In this case, Mr. Dusenbery filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of
the disposition hearing held on November 23, 2010, and the rider review hearing held
on March 28, 2011.

That request was denied by the Supreme Court.

On appeal,

Mr. Dusenbery is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the
transcripts.

Mr. Dusenbery asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the

issue of whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Dusenbery's
request for probation in both cases because the applicable standard of review requires
an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the proceedings
in order to evaluate the district court's probationary decisions.
Supreme Court erred in denying his request.

5

Therefore, the Idaho

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Dusenbery Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With
The Necessary Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Dusenbery With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate
Review Of His Claims

The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law.

See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const.

art.I§13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiterv. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ). Const.
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of
Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute.
See I.C. § 19-2801.

Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a

transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates
the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court ..
. ." Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to
6

be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the
State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase
7

transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.

Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
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In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well established that an appellant

bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
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(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Dusenbery fails to
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply
and Mr. Dusenbery's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state
action alone which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is
a violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district
court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether
the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge
gained from its own official position and observations.

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho

367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983)
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wa/lace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977)
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the
quantity of drugs therein involved");

State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984)

(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected
11

to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the
decision to revoke probation.
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. The requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review
all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made
appropriate sentencing determinations.

"Where an appeal is taken from an order

refusing to reduce a sentence under Rule 35 [the appellate court's) scope of review
includes all information submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the
subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189
(Ct. App. 1985) (citing State v. Yarbrough, 106 Idaho 545 (Ct. App. 1984)) (emphasis
added). This is because in order to determine whether new information is presented
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, the reviewing court must first know what was
presented at sentencing. See also State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009)
("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation
of probation." (emphasis added)). In other words, an appellate court reviewing a district
court's sentencing/probationary decision conducts an independent review of the entire
record to determine if the record supports the district court's decisions. This standard of
review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not required to state their
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sentencing/probationary rationale on the record.

State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665, 666

(1984).

The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
Docket No 39057, 2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the foregoing
argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on probation. Id.
at 1.

After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the terms of his

probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction. Id. at 1-2.
After he completed his rider, the district court placed the defendant on probation. Id. at
2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and the district court
revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the district court's second order
revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. While rearticulating
the standard of review contained in Hanington, supra, 1 the Idaho Court of Appeals held

Another issue with Morgan is that it invites appellate counsel, in the event an appeal is
assigned to the Court of Appeals, to file motions directly with the Court of Appeals which
is not allowed under the Idaho Appellate Rules. In Morgan, the Court of Appeals
refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due
process because it does not have the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho
Supreme Court. Id. at 3. The Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the
authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was filed with the Court of Appeals
after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals and contained information or
argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. However, this
position is untenable because the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed
1
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that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the appeal
because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation
decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4.
Mr. Dusenbery recognizes that Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised
in this appeal.

However, Mr. Dusenbery argues that the Court of Appeals has since

directly with the Idaho Supreme Court. For example, Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states
as follows:
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the
Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to
augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR. 30 follow:
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Mr. Dusenbery is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to
an appeal to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Idaho Appellate Rule 11 0
expressly prohibits such filings.
Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that
Mr. Morgan could have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of
Appeals is contrary to the Idaho Appellate Rules.
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abandoned the Morgan standard of review and is currently relying on the Hanington
standard. 2
Further support for Mr. Dusenbery's position can be found in State v. Warren,
123 Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992), which was not overruled in Morgan.

In that case,

Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at
21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and the district court retained jurisdiction
for 180 days. Id. After completing the period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was
placed on another period of probation, which was ultimately revoked. Id. The district
court then sua sponte reduced the length of Mr. Warren's sentence.

Id.

Mr. Warren

then appealed and alleged that the district court should have further reduced the length
of his sentence. Id.

In support of that position, Mr. Warren argued that his probation

violation was trivial. Id. The Court of Appeals addressed that argument stating "Warren
incorrectly points to the nature of the probation violation by arguing that his violation
was trivial. This Court must look at the nature of the original criminal offense. in this
case aggravated battery where Warren bit off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court
of Appeals did not address the merits of his sentence reduction claim because
Mr. Warren had failed to provide a copy of the original Presentence Investigation Report

(hereinafter, PSI) and a transcript of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though
Mr. Warren did not appeal from the original sentence, and the original sentencing
hearing occurred years before the decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals held

See State v. Radford, Docket No 39263, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 749, 4
(Ct. App. 2012) ("When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence on an appeal from
a probation revocation order, we do not base our review only upon events that occurred
after the original pronouncement of sentence, but will examine the entire record,
encompassing events before and after the original judgment, including, but not limited
to, events that occurred during the probationary period.").
2
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that the transcript of that hearing was necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of
error. Moreover, there was no indication that a transcript of that hearing was created
before the probation violation hearing or that the district court referenced the original
sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that the
Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the
nature of the original offense.
Had Mr. Dusenbery failed to request the transcripts at issue, the Warren opinion
indicates that the merits of his issues would not be addressed on appeal.

See also

Coma, 133 Idaho at 34 ("It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to

provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the
claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal,
they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."); State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho
936, 937 (Ct. App. 1984) ("When a discretionary decision related to sentencing is
challenged on appeal, the appellant bears the burden of presenting a sufficient record to
evaluate the merits of the challenge.").
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal
because the applicable standard of review requires the appellate court to conduct an
impendent review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard
of review, the focus is not on the district court's express sentencing rationale; 3 to the
contrary, the question on appeal is whether the record itself supports the district court's

3

However, an abuse of discretion might be found if the district court employs a
particularly unreasonable or absurd sentencing/probationary analysis. Even under
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ultimate

sentencing/probationary

decisions.

As

such,

the

decision

to

deny

Mr. Dusenbery's request for the transcripts will render his appeal meaningless because
it will be presumed that the

missing

transcripts support the district court's

sentencing/probationary decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to the review of
Mr. Dusenbery's appellate claims on the merits and, therefore, Mr. Dusenbery should
either be provided with the requested transcripts or the presumption should not be
applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Dusenbery With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[to] hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to,
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government which no member of the Union may disregard."' Id. at 71-72.

those circumstances, the appellate court will still employ an independent review of the
record to determine if the ultimate decision is sound despite the unreasonable analysis.
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In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of

Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
According to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.

Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any
argument made or undercutting an argument.

Therefore, Mr. Dusenbery has not

obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
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Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held

that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function.

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to deny his oral Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion. Further, counsel is unable to
advise Mr. Dusenbery on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Dusenbery is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Dusenbery his

constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

19

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Probation In The First Case
And Failed To Place Mr. Dusenbery On Probation In The Second Case
Mr. Dusenbery asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused
its discretion when it revoked his probation. When a defendant appeals from an order
revoking probation, the Idaho Court of Appeals has utilized the following framework:
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987) .
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989).
Mr. Dusenbery is not challenging the district district's finding that he violated the
terms of his probation.

Accordingly, he only contests the district court's decision to

revoke his probation.

"A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be

overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion." State v.
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a district court's discretionary decision is
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable
to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason."
State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003). "In deciding whether revocation
of probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is
consistent with the protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App.
2001 ).
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Additionally, where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of
the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771
(Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Dusenbery does not allege
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an

abuse of discretion, Mr. Dusenbery must show that in light of the governing criteria, the
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the

individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
Prior to the final disposition/sentencing hearing Mr. Dusenbery had taken steps
to ensure he was successful on probation.

Mr. Dusenbery completed two treatment

programs while he was incarcerated in the Bannock County jail on the charges in the
Second case.

(R., pp.200-202.)

He also completed a recovery plan contract and a

probation plan which set forth a list of goals to facilitate his successful treatment in the
community.

(R., pp.205-206(8).)

At the final sentencing/disposition hearing,

Mr. Dusenbery's trial counsel described the details of a probation plan where
Mr. Dusenbery would stay in county jail for a year and work in the community.
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(Tr., p.48, L.9 - p.50, L.12.) Mr. Dusenbery made the following comments about this
plan at the final disposition/sentencing hearing:
I've been in and out of the system for a long time, your Honor. And I am
really looking for change. I believe that this program, not only would
benefit me, but if it was implemented ... that there are many other people
that have the same issues with returning from the rider programs ....
(Tr., p.54, Ls.12-18.)
There are mitigating factors present in this matter which, when viewed in light of
Mr. Dusenbery's probation plan, support the conclusion that the district court abused its
sentencing/probationary discretion.

Specifically, Mr. Dusenbery's addictions are

mitigating factors. Mr. Dusenbery has struggled with drugs and alcohol since he was
twelve years old.

(2008 Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.16.)

Mr. Dusenbery's first exposure to alcohol occurred when he was five-years old. (2012
Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment (hereinafter, ISMHA), p.2.) His uncle
thought it would be "funny" to get a five-year-old drunk.

(2012 ISMHA, p.2.)

Mr. Dusenbery was under the influence of drugs at the time of the commission of the
offenses in the First Case.

(2008 PSI, p.3.)

In fact, many of Mr. Dusenbery's legal

problems are associated with his substance addiction. (2012 ISMHA, p.3.) However,
his most recent substance addiction evaluation recommended intensive out-patient
treatment. (GAIN Recommendation and Referral Summary (hereinafter, GRRS), pp.6,
13.)

This recommendation is consistent with the probation plan Mr. Dusenbery

proposed where he would spend a year working and in treatment in county jail.
(Tr., p.48, L.9 - p.50, L.6.)
Additionally, Mr. Dusenbery's victimization is a mitigating factor. Mr. Dusenbery
had a difficult childhood. (2008 PSI, p.12.) His mother died in 2002 and he was still
suffering from that loss at the final disposition/sentencing hearing.
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(2008 PSI, p.12;

Tr., p.47, Ls.18-22.) When he was a child, his mother went

to prison for a drug related

robbery conviction. (2012 ISMHA, p.2.) His father was verbally abusive and both his
parents were severe drug and alcohol addicts. (2012 ISMHA, p.2.)
father died after he left a bar, tripped, and "banged his head."

Mr. Dusenbery's

(2012 ISHMA, p.2.)

Mr. Dusenbery reported a history of violence including being attacked with a weapon,
being beaten, and being exposed to emotional abuse. (GRRS, p.12.) He also scored
high on the Lifetime General Victimization Scale. (GRRS p.12.)
Despite these setbacks, Mr. Dusenbery completed high school and attended
some college courses.
2001

(2008 PSI, p.14.)

He also earned a "real estate license" in

(2008 PSI, p.14.) He has work experience as a carpenter and a certified welder.

(2008 PSI, p.14.) Mr. Dusenbery has remained employed with the same employer for a
period of eight years. (Substance Abuse Assessment attached to the 2008 PSI, p.4.)
While on his second rider, Mr. Dusenbery received only one verbal warning for
pacing in a unit and he corrected his behavior. (2011 Addendum to the PSI (hereinafter,
APSI), p.3.)

Otherwise, he had no disciplinary actions.

(2011

APSI, p.3.)

Mr. Dusenbery performed well on his rider and was "surprised about the positive help"
he was able to extend to other participants in his programming. (2011 APSI, p.4.)
In sum, Mr. Dusenbery needed the structure of the county jail work release
program to succeed in the community.

This is consistent with his most recent

substance addiction evaluation, which recommended intensive outpatient treatment.
This is highly relevant because the majority of Mr. Dusenbery's legal problems are
directly related to his addictions.

Had Mr. Dusenbery been allowed to adhere to his

probation plan it would have simultaneously promoted his rehabilitation while protecting
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society. As such, the district court abused its discretion when it revoked probation and
refused to place Mr. Dusenbery on probation.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Dusenbery respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Dusenbery

respectfully requests that this Court remand these cases with instruction to place him on
probation.
DATED this 22 nd day of January, 2013.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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